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ABSTRACT: The contribution of the grape growing and wine making industries to Australia’s 
continued economic prosperity is under threat. While international market dynamics are often 
cited as the cause, the problem of oversupply and more specifically calls for government 
intervention were the focus of the recently completed NSW Legislative Council’s Standing 
Committee on State Development Wine Grape Market and Prices Inquiry (Catanzariti 
Inquiry, 2010a). This paper examines the process and outcomes of the Inquiry and the NSW 
Government’s response to its recommendations. It is argued that a mandatory Code of 
Conduct ought to be adopted by the industry to govern the relationships between winegrape 
growers and wine makers. 
 




The rapid expansion of the Australian wine industry can be measured in several ways. For 
example, between 1990-91 and 2007-08, wine production increased from 346 million litres to 
1.3 billion litres, exports increased from 57 million litres to over 714 million litres, with a 
commensurate increase in value from $180 million to $2.7 billion. Similarly, the total vine-
bearing grape area grew from approximately 61 000 hectares to 166 000 hectares. 
Additionally, beyond mere indices of commodity production and sales, the number of 
wineries increased from approximately 600 in 1990-91 to almost 1900 in 2004-05 (see, for 
example, Banks, et al., 2007; ABS 2009a). Moreover, this value-adding economic activity is 
now widely dispersed across rural and regional Australia, covering over 60 wine-producing 
regions (Australian Wine Region Maps, 2011).  
More recently, however, the industry has been a victim of its own success. While the 
national production (or ‘crush’) continued to increase up until 2007-08, the value of wine sold 
domestically declined by 4 per cent (Jackson, et al., 2009: 2) with exports declining 9.2 per 
cent and the unit value of exported wine continuing to decline from a peak of $5.17 per litre 
in 2000-01 to $3.75 in 2007-08. Further, the value of wine imported into Australia during the 
same period increased by 40.8 per cent from 2006-07 (ABS, 2009). Imported wine is 
expected to rise to 18 per cent of domestic consumption by 2013-14 (Jackson, et al., 2009: 2). 
The problem of oversupply has been widely recognised from 2006 (see, for example, 
ABARE, 2006; Gent, 2010) and according to the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and 
Resource Economics (ABARE) (Jackson, et al., 2009) has its origins not only in rapidly 
expanded capacity, but stagnant demand for wine globally, as well as relative decreasing costs 
of production in Australia’s new world and old world competitors. The industry has found 
itself ‘holding the baby’ of expanded capacity – and an inventory estimated at 100 million 
cases, set to double in three years. While this situation might signal a boon for domestic 
consumers, the wine industry has claimed that ‘oversupply is unpicking our price structure, 
distorting perceptions about our product and exacerbating competitive pressures’; further, ‘we 
have been forced to trade in the low value/low margin market to sell excess wine’ (WRAA, 
2009b). Moreover, with increasing costs and unfavourable terms of trade continuing, many 
have forecast that the viability of the industry is under significant pressure (see, for example, 
Sheales, et al., 2006; WRAA 2009a; 2009b). 
What, if any, action can be taken to alleviate this situation has been the subject of 
intense debate in Australia. This debate, anchored in arguments concerning government 
intervention into commodity production, ‘market failure’, ‘government failure’ and the 
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continuing prosperity of Australia’s disparate regions, form the subject of this paper. For 
while it may be convenient to sheet home the idea of heavy-handed regulation of primary 
industries in Australia to a time passed (see, for example, Gow and Grant, 2010) the situation 
of the wine industry, and, in particular, the plight of grape growers has risen to political 
prominence at both state and federal levels of government. More specifically, this paper 
examines the relationship of the industry to government regulation through the lens of the 
recently completed NSW Legislative Council’s Standing Committee on State Development 
Wine Grape Market and Prices Inquiry, headed by Hon. Tony Catanzariti, from September to 
December 2010 (Catanzariti Inquiry) and to which the O’Farrell Coalition Government tabled 
a response on 12 December 2011 (NSW Government, 2011). 
The paper itself is divided into six main parts. Section two examines the four recent 
responses to the deteriorating fortunes on the wine industry, namely: (i) populist calls for a 
vine-pull scheme; (ii) recent attempts at industry self-regulation, (iii) the analysis of ABARE 
and the (iv) advice stemming from the 2005 Senate Inquiry The Operation of the Wine-
Making Industry (Murray Inquiry, 2005). Section three describes the Catanzariti Inquiry 
(2010), focussing in particular on the way in which the concept of market failure was 
discussed in the course of depositions and the Inquiry’s Final Report (Catzanariti Inquiry, 
2010a). Section four examines the recommendations of the Inquiry and O’Farrell 
Government’s response to the Inquiry’s recommendations, arguing that the NSW Government 
missed an opportunity to encourage innovation in the industry, and that it ought to have 
grasped the nettle and introduced a mandatory Code of Conduct for the NSW wine industry. 
Section six summarises the findings of the discussion. 
 
2 RESPONDING TO UNCERTAIN TIMES 
Figures for 2009-10 indicate that the wine industry has commenced a belated adaptation to the 
twin problems of oversupply and falling demand. The national production (or ‘crush’) for 
2009-10 was measured at 1.6 million tonnes (a decrease of 0.1 million tonnes or 7.5 per cent) 
and the total area of grape cultivation fell from 166 to 152 thousand hectares; a significant 
reversal of long term trends. Further, yields dropped from 11.8 to 10.1 tonnes per hectare and 
total wine production decreased by 3.4 per cent to 1.14 billion litres (ABS, 2009; 2010). This 
decrease in overall supply contrasts with projections made by ABARE as recently as 2009, 
which forecast production continuing to increase to include a total area of vines under 
cultivation of 171 thousand hectares, with the reality now falling some 20 thousand hectares 
short of this mark.  
5 
This small but significant contraction in vine area was matched by other encouraging 
signs, with exports rising by 4.8 per cent to 789 million litres, domestic sales increasing by 
4.7 per cent and the value of the national inventory declining by 8.3 per cent to 1.7 billion 
litres (ABS, 2009; 2010). Despite imports of wine increasing by 3.3 per cent from 2008-09, 
this increase has to be considered in the context of the substantial 40.8 per cent rise in imports 
the previous year (ABS, 2009; 2010). Yet the encouraging picture suggested by this data – of 
slowly declining production and inventory matched by increasing exports – does not mitigate 
the longer term trends and dynamics described for the sustainability of the Australian wine 
industry generally, particularly in newly emerging regions. The notional correction to 
oversupply in 2009-10 was recently labelled by one key industry player as being far from 
adequate to address the problems and long-term situation of the industry (ABC, 2011).  
Four reactions to the changing fortunes of the Australian wine industry can be 
identified. The first has been the call for a vine-pull scheme. For example, on 6 January 2010 
Doug Lehmann, Managing Director of Peter Lehmann Wines, ‘warned that the Australian 
wine industry must rip out 35,000 hectares of vineyards to restore the imbalance between 
supply and demand’ (Greenblat, 2010a). This call was also echoed on 12 January 2010 by 
John Casella, who suggested that the market was suffering from a 20 per cent oversupply of 
grapes and called for a similar response (Greenblat, 2010b). While this reaction by two of 
Australia’s largest wine producers may be understandable in the face of falling demand and 
falling returns, it can nevertheless be labelled a populist reaction based not upon a reasoned 
course of policy. Moreover, it failed to take into account the adverse affects of the last 
government-assisted vine-pull scheme (see, for example, Gow and Grant, 2010). 
The second response has seen an attempt at industry self-regulation. On 10 November 
2009 four industry organisations, the Winemakers’ Federation of Australia (WFA), the Wine 
Grape Growers’ Association (WGGA), the Australian Wine and Brandy Corporation 
(AWBC; now Wine Australia) and the Grape and Wine Research and Development 
Corporation (GWRDC) released a Joint Statement and Supporting Report titled the ‘Wine 
Restructuring Action Agenda’ (WRAA, 2009a; 2009b). The statement called for a range of 
measures to be introduced by government and industry. These included, as an ‘immediate 
response’, the encouragement of a critical self-assessment of the economic viability of 
individual wine operations based upon region-specific data and specific wine industry 
accounting tools, alongside briefings in fourteen targeted regional areas and negotiation with 
the federal government over ‘improved exit packages for growers and small wineries seeking 
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to leave the industry along the lines of drought and small irrigator exit packages’ (WRAA, 
2009a). 
While negotiations for exit packages proved ultimately unsuccessful, the WRAA also 
undertook to work with the federal government to re-examine elements of the Wine 
Equalisation Tax (WET) ‘that artificially allow uneconomic business to stay in business’; to 
clarify misconceptions surrounding the profitability of investing in the wine industry based 
upon Managed Investment Schemes (MIS) and address issues of environmental as well as 
financial sustainability at a regional level. The WRAA also included commitments to R&D 
initiatives concentrated on market development, in particular in N.E. Asia and promotional 
activity in that region (WRAA, 2009a). While some elements of these proposals have been 
criticised as favouring particular sectors of the Australian wine industry (see Grant, Gow and 
Dollery, 2011; for a reply, see Strachan, 2010) the actions of the four peak industry 
organisations was far removed from a demand for wholesale government intervention into the 
industry.  
The third response that can be identified is that of the peak agricultural research 
organisation in Australia, ABARE. Through a series of reports (see, for example, Jackson, et 
al., 2009; Sheales, et al., 2006), ABARE has recommended a market-based approach to the 
problems facing the Australian wine industry, including identifying emerging markets (as per 
the WWRA discussed above) and increasing the competitiveness of the industry based upon 
six recommendations: 
 
 Increasing the average size of grower operations (partly through smaller operators leaving 
the industry) so as to realise scale efficiencies 
 
 Adjusting business models through more contracting, leasing, share farming and 
cooperative arrangements designed to achieve better financial performance for growers 
and the industry as a whole 
 
 Maintaining or increasing investment in research and development aimed at developing 
and adopting new technologies to increase on- and off-farm productivity 
 
 Developing improved relationships between wineries and grape growers to ensure that 
information flows will better equip industry participants to respond to new and emerging 
market trends 
 
 Maintaining an appreciation of global and domestic supply chain dynamics to allow 
growers and wineries to better position their businesses and products and 
 
 Developing value adding opportunities that satisfy changing consumer demands (Sheales, 
et al., 2006: 5). 
 
As such, while ABARE has recommended an increase in the size of firms alongside a variety 
of other reforms – including the exploration of different business models to encourage 
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enhanced financial performance – it did not advocate direct government intervention into the 
market. 
The fourth response has been that of the federal government. As we have seen, 
interactions between the industry and government have recent times been mediated by several 
organizations – many of which, such as the WFA, Wine Australia, the WGGA and the 
GWRDC – are statutory corporations of the federal government. This era of state-industry 
relations ought to be viewed as qualitatively distinct from the previous situation where, in 
common with the other agricultural commodities, both the wine grape and dried fruit grape 
industries were heavily regulated and protected, with some prices for both commodities 
vested (see, for example, Gow, Kane and Musgrave, 19911). Yet this change in regulatory 
environment has not taken place in the absence of political interest in the industry. On the 
contrary, three Commonwealth Parliamentary Committee Inquiries have been conducted since 
1999. The first of these was a Select Committee on the New Tax System which was 
responsible for the drafting of the Wine Equalisation Tax (WET) Bill, alongside the Luxury 
Car Tax Bill, conducted in April 1999; the second was conducted in August 2004 by the 
Economics Committee into the Wine Producer Rebate and Other Measures Bill (Parliament of 
Australia, 2011).  
While these two Inquiries largely confined themselves to the introduction of the WET, 
then compensation to the industry for it, the terms of reference (TORs) for the third Inquiry, 
‘The Operation of the Wine-making Industry’, chaired by Hon Senator Andrew Murray 
(Murray Inquiry) conducted by the Committee for Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport 
in 1995, were more broad. The Inquiry was asked to examine ‘the operation of the wine-
making industry, with particular reference to the supply and purchase of grapes’ (Murray 
Inquiry, 2005, 1). The Inquiry chose to focus upon four factors, (i) ‘the size and nature of the 
winegrape glut and the inventory levels of producers; (ii) the structure of the industry, in 
particular the relationship between growers and winemakers as expressed in contracts 
                                               
1 Gow, Kane and Musgrave (1991) noted that grape production is inherently unresponsive to market signals due 
to the planning horizon of production being approximately 40 years – the life of a vine – encouraging producers 
to accept prices below the cost of production for several consecutive years due to costs of change. Further, Gow, 
Kane and Musgrave (1991) also noted the regulation surrounding the grape industries (both winegrape and dried 
fruit grape) in the 1980s. First, both commodities were subject to an exemption of Section 45 of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 – that part of the Act prohibiting price fixing, monopolisation and exclusive dealing) so that a 
two-price scheme for each commodity could operate (one price for the domestic market; one for exports) from 
which levees were drawn and redistributed to producers. Second, both industries were overseen by ‘single desk’ 
bureaucracies that fixed prices, with the federal government underwriting sultana production equal to eighty 
percent of the average equalised returns over the previous three seasons. (see, in particular, Gow and Grant, 
2010, 29).  
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between the two, with a view to assessing the implementation of a code of conduct – either 
voluntary or mandatory; (iii) what it termed the ‘adequacy’ of the Trade Practices Act [TPA] 
(1974) to the industry and (iv) the need for a national grape-growers representative body 
(Murray Inquiry, 2005). 
The Committee received a relatively small number of submissions – 30 – comprising of 
several from growers complaining that, for example, while ‘some wineries treat growers 
reasonably, others act like Nazis’ by taking advantage of an asymmetrical market, imposing 
penalties and deductions on growers for the quality and timing of their grapes and paying 
unreasonably low prices (Murray Inquiry, 2005, 75). The Australian Consumer Competition 
Commission (ACCC) also made a submission (ACCC, 2005) as did several industry peak 
bodies, including the WFA, the AWBC and the WGGA (Murray Inquiry, 2005). The 
Committee made four recommendations: 
 
1. The committee recommends that the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Forestry should consult with state authorities and peak bodies with a view to 
establishing a national register of vines. 
 
2. The committee recommends that the Government should give priority to amending 
the Trade Practices Act 1974 to add unilateral variation clauses in contracts to the list 
of matters which a court may have regard to in deciding whether conduct is 
unconscionable. 
 
3. The committee recommends that the Government, in consultation with representative 
organisations for winegrape growers and winemakers, should make a mandatory code 
of conduct under the Trade Practices Act to regulate sale of winegrapes. 
 
4. The committee recommends that any national wine industry body should be separate 
from a winemaker’s representative body (Murray Inquiry, 2005, 65). 
 
The response by Government – a short three page document – endorsed only the second 
recommendation, namely an alteration of the TPA 1974, specifically that section 51AC ‘be 
amended to provide that unilateral variation clauses should be added to the list of matters 
which a court may have regard to in deciding whether or not conduct is unconscionable’ 
(Minister for Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2006). In effect, the response by the federal 
government, despite recognising the importance of the industry to Australia’s economy, chose 
to take the advice of the ACCC (2005) which noted in its submission that while it had 
received complaints over the conduct of wineries, it found that practices ‘fall short of being 
unconscionable conduct within the meaning of the Trade Practices Act’ (Murray Inquiry, x; 
emphasis added) and noted inter alia that ‘in many instances growers had not effectively 
utilised the review and mediation provisions of their contractual agreements’, and that 
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‘grower complaints over the fairness of price and quality assessments are not always 
completely accurate (ACCC, 2005, 5). 
The recommendations of the Murray Inquiry did find affect beyond the Australian 
Government’s response: A national representative body for grape growers – the WGGA – 
was formed in 2005 following a report from the Centre for International Economics (WGGA, 
2011a). Further, a voluntary code of conduct was introduced in December 2008, although to 
date it has few signatories, albeit being inclusive of the major companies in the Australian 
market (see WGGA, 2011b). Nevertheless, as we shall see, the problem of grape producers 
being price-takers in a market of oversupply continues. It is to this continuing problem that 
the Catanzariti Inquiry (2010) was directed to address and it is to this that we now turn. 
3 NSW LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL’S STANDING COMMITTEE ON STATE 
DEVELOPMENT WINE GRAPE MARKET AND PRICES (CATANZARITI 
INQUIRY) (2010) 
The Catanzariti Inquiry was one of 197 inquiries conducted by the fifty fourth Parliament of 
NSW. The Inquiry was undertaken by the Standing Committee on State Development, which 
in turn is one of 47 Committees of the Parliament, comprised of members of the Legislative 
Assembly, Legislative Council or both (in the form of Joint Committees) alongside 
individuals representing particular organisations, such as the NSW Ombudsman. The 
processes of parliamentary inquiries and the responses of government offer a fascinating 
portrait of some of the day-to-day work of Parliamentarians and, importantly, those 
employees of the Parliament who are tasked with organising the work of the committees. For 
example, the fifty fourth Parliament held inquiries on an impressive range of topics, including 
improper associations in the NSW police force, environmental grants administration and 
graffiti and public infrastructure (Parliament of New South Wales, 2011). 
The problem of oversupply and, more specifically, the depressed prices grape growers 
were receiving in the Riverina district of NSW was the catalyst for the Inquiry. The Wine 
Grapes Marketing Board (WGMB), an organization that has continually operated in the local 
government areas of the City of Griffith, Leeton, Carrathool and Murrumbidgee (the 
Riverina) since 1933, called upon the State Labor Government to inquire into the industry. 
The WGMB did not mince its words: 
 
The Board in seeking this inquiry is of the belief that the industry’s market is flawed and 
requires legislative instruments to be introduced to remedy many of the problems that are being 
faced by wine grape growers that are not typical of a market with current structural supply and 
demand problems (WGMB, 2010: 1). 
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Terms of reference (ToRs) for an Inquiry were referred to the Legislative Council’s Standing 
Committee on State Development by Steve Whan MP, Minister for Primary Resources, 
Emergency Services and Rural Affairs on 5 August 2010. MP Tony Catanzariti, head of the 
Committee on State Development and hailing from the Griffith area, was appointed Chair of 
the Inquiry, with the National Party’s Hon. Rick Colless serving as Deputy Chair2. The Terms 
of reference stated that the Committee inquire into ‘factors affecting the wine grape market 
and prices’, in particular:  
 
 a. Price formation, including factors affecting supply and demand 
 
 b. The role of the Wine Grapes Marketing Board has played in facilitating the use of 
voluntary codes of conduct and sale contracts 
 
 c. The potential for collective bargaining and/ or codes of conduct to contribute to an 
efficient market  
 
 d. Whether there are any measures which could improve market signals which would be 
consistent with competition principles and law  
 
 e. Any other related matter.  
 
Notable is the similarity between these terms of reference and how the Murray Inquiry (2005) 
chose to approach its broad ambit. Moreover, the specific TORs of the Catanzariti Inquiry 
strongly inferred that the Committee consider the problems which formed the central focus of 
the Murray Senate Inquiry (2005), namely the relationship between grape growers and 
winemakers; more specifically in the traditional, warm climate regions of the Riverina and 
Murray Valley areas of NSW. Perusing the submissions to the Inquiry from grape growers in 
the Riverina (see, for example, submissions Nos. 1-13, Catanzariti Inquiry, 2010b) as well as 
the transcript of day two of the hearings, conducted in Griffith, 14 October 2010 (Catanzariti 
Inquiry, 2010c), it is clear that grape growers in the Riverina were very much ‘price-takers’ in 
the current market conditions. 
A portrait of the situation in this particular region was provided by Mr Lawrie Stanford, 
Executive Director, Wine Grape Growers Australia (WGGA – one of four industry bodies 
behind the WRAA; Mr Stanford was also previously Manager of Information and Analysis 
with the AWBC), who, in his spoken evidence to the Inquiry 13 October 2010, chose to frame 
the problems facing the wine industry in terms of market failure: 
                                               
2 The other Members of the Committee were the Hon Sophie Cotsis (ALP), the Hon Matthew Mason-Cox 
(Liberal Party), the Revd. the Hon Fred Nile MLC (Christian Democratic Party) and the Hon Mick Veitch (ALP) 





The industry is significantly oversupplied and in a free market situation that creates a very 
unfavourable environment for wine grape growers ... The belief is that the market will sort it 
and nothing needs to be done, but on two counts I would say there needs to be consideration of 
intervention. One is a case I would make for market failure particularly in respect to coastal 




The second reason I see a need for some consideration of intervention is the fact that markets 
do not always deliver social expectations, and that is why economists do not run the country, 
politicians do, and economists advise politicians—so, welcome to you all—and there are 
certain community expectations about ethical commercial behaviour and we see a clear 
instance in the negotiation of market prices for wine grapes for that to occur. (Stanford, cited in 
Catanzariti Inquiry, 2010d, 2). 
 
In fact, the Final Report of the Catanzariti Inquiry (2010a, 22-23) took some time to examine 
the concept of market failure and the claims surrounding it, citing extensively from evidence 
given on 13 October by Stewart Webster from NSW Industry and Investment (NSW I&I). On 
the one hand, the Final Report clearly recognised the importance of the principles of free 
market competition in determining prices, citing Mr Webster to this effect: 
 
Competition principles agreements are pretty clear. Governments have a responsibility to first 
determine if the market failure is great enough to warrant intervention because all intervention 
has cost associated and, as it says, the costs have to be outweighed by the benefits. Secondly, 
just because you think that there is a market failure that you could do something about and in 
doing so derive a benefit for the community, it does not follow that you can pick the most 
powerful intervention off the shelf. You should pick the one that will deal with the market 
failure with the least cost associated with it (Webster, cited in Catanzariti Report, 2010a, 22). 
 
However, Mr Webster also stated: 
The reason that we have AIS [Agricultural Industry Services] committees in New South Wales 
is because there has been market failure—and there are about half a dozen of them identified, 
and those committees are seen as the least competition-restricting way of dealing with those 
market failures. The kind of markets you might be interested in here—there are two of them—
is what they call imperfect competition, which is your market power discrepancy and there is 
also possibly an information asymmetry market failure, which is where one side of a deal 
knows more than the other side (Webster, cited in Catanzariti Report, 2010a, 23). 
 
Further, when giving oral evidence to the Inquiry on 13 October 2010, Chief Economist for 
I&I NSW, Mr Scott Davenport, urged the Inquiry to focus on precisely the same issue which 
the 2005 Senate Committee had chosen not to regulate, namely that of ‘unconscionable 
conduct’, stating: ‘If I could comment just quickly… the market failure that we are talking 
about here is that unconscionable conduct issue, so we can refine our focus to that’ (emphasis 
added). In his evidence Mr Davenport also stated: ‘The Commonwealth has always taken a 
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strong view that that is what the Trade Practices Act is there for…I think that is sort of getting 
to the nub of the answer...’3 (Davenport, cited in Catanzariti Inquiry, 2010d, 28).  
As such, the Committee of Inquiry heard strong, diametrically opposed arguments. On 
the one hand, an argument for government intervention based upon two particular types of 
market failure: First, that based in market power asymmetry; second, that based in 
information asymmetry. On the other hand, a strong argument for non-intervention into the 
market was put forward by I&I NSW. These objections to government intervention were 
grounded on the principles of competition (in evidence presented by Stewart Webster) and 
reinforced in Scott Davenport’s suggestion that the focus of the Inquiry ought to be confined 
to the issue of unconscionable conduct, that is, that recourse to the principle of contract under 
current arrangements ought to suffice as a mechanism for the governance of grape prices. 
Additionally, the Committee of Inquiry was also made aware that the problem of 
depressed grape prices and market failure were by no means uniform across the state. On the 
contrary, while evidence presented by the WGMB suggested that it was the financially 
unviable production of wines in temperate regions which were responsible for oversupply, 
alternatively, both oral and written evidence given in joint submission by the University of 
Southern Queensland and the University of New England argued that cool climate producers 
were attracting good prices per tonne for their produce, as opposed to the paltry sums being 
achieved by growers in the Riverina (see, for example, Grant, cited in Catanzariti Inquiry, 
2010d, 32). Moreover, these submissions also argued that while grape growing in cool 
climate regions was to an extent protected from the worst extremes of depressed markets due 
to it being horizontally integrated (i.e., as an element to mixed farming activities, such as beef 
and wool production) it was also holding out the promise of revitalising some regions in NSW 
on the basis of vertical integration, wherein grape growing was seen as one element to a wine 
and food tourism industry (see, Catanzariti Inquiry, 2010d, 28-32). Thus, the decision by the 
Inquiry as to intervene into the market or not – and to what extent – was also conflated by the 
concept of inter-regional equity, and the fact that one region’s pudding might be another’s 
                                               
3 The Catanzariti Report (2010a, 23) also noted that while unconscionable conduct might be the nub of the issue, 
it was by no means clear what constituted unconscionable behaviour. For example, Mr Davenport argued that it 
is important to distinguish between low prices generated by market conditions and unconscionable behaviour: 
 
We need to be mindful of whether we are talking about just price declines due to those 
international market conditions or we are talking about unconscionable conduct. That is a very 
key distinct point to try to look at to see what evidence there is of unconscionable conduct as 
opposed to wineries just normally meeting, as was said in our submission, capacity constraints 
(Davenport, in Catanzariti Inquiry, 2010a, 23-34). 
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poison (see, in particular, Mounter, et al., 2011). It was with these factors in mind that the 
Committee developed its recommendations and the newly elected O’Farrell Coalition 
Government responded. It is to a consideration of these events that we now turn. 
 
4 Catanzariti Inquiry (2010) Recommendations and O’Farrell Government 
Response (2011) 
With these perspectives all impressing themselves on the Committee, the Inquiry tabled its 
Final Report on 2 December 2010, the recommendations of which are contained in Column 1 
of Table 1. The O’Farrell Government’s response to these recommendations, which was 
initially scheduled to be tabled 2 June 2011, but which was eventually tabled 12 December 
2011 (the delay being due to the change in Government following the State election on 13 
March 2011) are contained in Column 2 of Table 1. 
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Table 1  Catanzariti Inquiry (2010) Recommendations and O’Farrell Government Response 
(2011) 
 
Catanzariti Inquiry (2010) Recommendations, 2 
December 2010 
O’Farrell Government Response, 12 December 
2011 
1. That Industry and Investment NSW and the Wine 
Grapes Marketing Board fund a consultant to provide 
targeted business advice for grape growers in the 
Riverina district to assist in responding to industry 
re-structuring. 
The Rural Financial Counselling Program already provides 
business advice in the region, funded by the NSW and 
Australian Governments. 
2. That the NSW Government consult with 
stakeholders, including other governments as 
appropriate, to determine the cost-effectiveness of 
scientific methodologies for analysing red wine 
grape colour. 
The NSW Government is already supporting research being 
undertaken by the National Grape & Wine Industry Centre at 
Wagga Wagga - a joint Department of Primary Industries 
and Charles Sturt University facility. 
3. That the NSW Government seek an amendment to 
the Wine Grapes Marketing Board (Reconstitution) 
Act 2003 to require wineries to publish by 30 June 
each year an indicative price list for wine grapes for 
winegrapes for the coming season. 
The introduction of this recommendation has been 
previously attempted and was rejected by both growers and 
winemakers. 
4. That the NSW Government consult with the wine 
grape industry to determine the most effective 
safeguards to ensure that the indicative price list 
system provides an accurate source of information to 
wine grape growers.  
An annual price dispersion report is already published in 
July each year, four months after the end of vintage. 
5. That the NSW Government investigate the 
feasibility of requiring that all wineries offer the 
same terms of payment for wine grapes to growers 
This would be anti-competitive for the market, as it would 
put NSW winemakers and growers at a competitive 
disadvantage with other regions where such requirements do 
not apply. 
6. That in the absence of a mandated Wine Industry 
Code of Conduct, which includes a terms of payment 
schedule, the Wine Grapes Marketing Board's terms 
of payment function continue.  
The industry already has a national voluntary code that deals 
with the terms and conditions of payment. This code is 
currently under review. 
7. That the NSW government investigate the most 
appropriate methods to ensure that a winery has paid 
in full for the previous season's vintage before it can 
accept any wine grapes from the next growing 
season.  
See response to (5). 
8. That the NSW Minister for Primary Industries 
pursue the introduction of a mandatory Code of 
Conduct through the Primary Industries Ministerial 
Council, including reviewing the effectiveness of 
penalties for breaches of the Code.  
The NSW Government will reserve its position on this 
recommendation until the review of the industry's current 
Code of Conduct is completed, and adequate consultation 
has been conducted with NSW growers. 
9. That if the Wine Industry Code of Conduct is 
mandated, the NSW Minister for Primary Industries 
ask the Ministerial Council to review its dispute 
resolution process to determine its effectiveness. 
No outcomes have been produced from the review of the 
current Code of Conduct. 
10. That if the Wine Industry Code of Conduct 
remains voluntary, the NSW Government investigate 
the utility of forming an independent dispute 
resolution body to monitor and investigate 
complaints and disputes concerning price 
determination and contractual disputes in the wine 
grape sector.  
The dispute resolution facilities of the voluntary 
Code of Conduct would be adequate if used. 
11. That the Wine Grapes Marketing Board works 
with growers in the Riverina to develop a model for 
collective marketing of grapes.  
No response was given to this recommendation. 
Source: Catanzariti Inquiry 2010a, xiii-iv; NSW Government, 2011. 
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An examination of Table 1 reveals that while pursuing the combined recommendations of the 
Inquiry would constitute significant government intervention into the situation of perceived 
market failure, the response of government was distinctly laissez faire. Of the eleven 
recommendations of the Inquiry, # 3 (‘That the NSW Government seek an amendment to the 
Wine Grapes Marketing Board (Reconstitution) Act 2003 to require wineries to publish by 30 
June each year an indicative price list for wine grapes for winegrapes for the coming season’), 
# 4 (‘That the NSW Government consult with the wine grape industry to determine the most 
effective safeguards to ensure that the indicative price list system provides an accurate source 
of information to wine grape growers’) as well as # 5 (‘That the NSW Government 
investigate the feasibility of requiring that all wineries offer the same terms of payment for 
wine grapes to growers’ [emphasis added]) amount to government regulating wine grape 
prices to the extent that a price guarantee (i.e.: vesting) is implemented for grapes with 
particular qualities – hence the need to find an objective benchmark of quality as specified in 
recommendation # 2 (‘that the NSW Government consult with stakeholders, including other 
governments as appropriate, to determine the cost-effectiveness of scientific methodologies 
for analysing red wine grape colour’)4. Further, recommendation # 7 (‘that the NSW 
government investigate the most appropriate methods to ensure that a winery has paid in full 
for the previous season’s vintage before it can accept any wine grapes from the next growing 
season’) can also be assessed as ‘heavy handed’ in that it suggests the introduction of specific 
oversight and regulation of contracts in addition to that provided in law by (for example) the 
Trade Practices Act (1975). 
Further, recommendations # 1 (‘that Industry and Investment NSW and the Wine Grapes 
Marketing Board fund a consultant to provide targeted business advice for grape growers in 
the Riverina district to assist in responding to industry re-structuring) and # 11 (‘that the Wine 
Grapes Marketing Board works with growers in the Riverina to develop a model for collective 
marketing of grapes’) suggest that the NSW Government, in association with a statutory 
corporation of federal government (i.e.: the WGMB) initiate a marketing strategy for the 
Riverina region. While in itself these recommendations amount to government, or at least 
public-private partnerships developing so-called ‘club goods’ and ‘chain goods’ (McNutt, 
1999) for the burgeoning industry, and as such may appear to be a reasonable way to proceed 
                                               
4 The extent to which such an objective standard, or indeed set of objective standards, is achievable, let alone 
desirable, is dubious indeed: In an industry to an extent predicated on highly subjective standards and comprised 
of both innovation and fashion, this would appear to be beyond the scope of the most rigorous set of scientific 
procedures. 
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(see, for example, Mounter, et al., 2011) the fact that the Inquiry made this recommendation 
for the Riverina district alone (i.e.: not coinciding with a similar strategy for other wine 
regions in NSW, such as the Hunter Valley, Central Tablelands, Hilltops, etc.) is 
extraordinary.  
Recommendations 8, 9 and 10 all deal with the implementation of a Code of Conduct for 
the industry: Recommendation # 8 argues that the NSW Minister for Primary Industries 
pursue the implementation of a national, mandatory Code of Conduct through the Primary 
Industries Ministerial Council; recommendation # 9 suggests a court of dispute in the event of 
such a mandatory Code being introduced, while recommendation # 10 argues for the 
implementation of ‘an independent dispute resolution body’ should such a Code of Conduct 
remain voluntary – when such a body is already in place under the existing voluntary Code of 
Conduct, a fact duly noted in the response to the recommendations by the O’Farrell 
Government. As such, the Inquiry’s recommendations can be assessed as strongly favouring 
intervention of the kind suggested by Mr Lawrie Stanford, Executive Director of WGGA, 
ranging from vesting prices on the one hand (based upon objective, arbitrary markers of grape 
quality) to the implementation of various regimes of oversight and the development of a 
marketing plan for but one wine region in the state, the Riverina. 
The O’Farrell Government was dismissive of all the Inquiry’s recommendations on the 
basis of laissez fare principles. Examining column 2 of Table 1, we can see that to the 
suggestion that ‘all wineries offer the same terms of payments for wine grapes to growers’ 
(recommendation # 5) the Government response stated: ‘This would be anti-competitive for 
the market, as it would put NSW winemakers and growers at a competitive disadvantage with 
other regions where such requirements do not apply’. It reiterated this response in dealing 
with recommendation # 7, namely that the Government ‘investigate the most appropriate 
methods to ensure that a winery has paid in full for the previous season's vintage before it can 
accept any wine grapes from the next growing season’; it was equally dismissive of 
recommendations # 1 and 11, that the government introduce further targeted business advice, 
or that be involved in developing a model for the collective marketing of grapes (in fact, it did 
not even respond the latter recommendation). Moreover, it ‘reserved its position’ with respect 
to all recommendations involving the introduction of a mandatory Code of Conduct, or indeed 
developments to the voluntary Code of Conduct, on the basis that at the time the Voluntary 
Code of Conduct was at the time under review. 
So what are we to make of this episode in the ‘governance of grapes’ in NSW as we have 
discussed it here, and any possible broader implications for the Australian wine industry? 
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Should governments intervene into this burgeoning – but faltering – element of Australia’s 
regional economies – as argued by the WGGA, the recommendations of the Catanzariti 
Inquiry and others? Alternatively, should those growers that fail to adapt be left to ‘wither on 
the vine’, as the O’Farrell Government’s response to the recommendations of the Inquiry 
appears to imply? Or is the problem that the policy alternatives are posed in precisely this 
way, namely as intervention versus the ‘free market’? It is to these questions that we now 
turn. 
 
5 OBSERVATIONS: BEYOND THE IDEOLOGICAL DIVIDE? A MANDATORY 
CODE OF CONDUCT? 
The first point to be made in this regard is to emphasise the ideological nature of the choices 
represented by the recommendations of the Committee on the one hand and the response of 
the O’Farrell Government on the other. Faced with evidence presented by both 
representatives of growers and state government bureaucrats, the Committee – comprised of 
individuals from all points of the political spectrum in Australian politics (Labor, National, 
Liberal and even Christian Democrat) reached for policy instruments which relied upon the 
concepts of market failure based power discrepancy and asymmetrical information, and which 
exhibited a clear regional bias (and as such was open to charges of being inequitable).  
Equally, the response of the O’Farrell Government can be seen to echo the arguments of 
those witnesses from I & I NSW, in particular that of Mr Webster, who argued that any 
market failure identified has to be great enough to warrant intervention because any 
intervention has costs associated with it, and that the type of intervention must be the one 
with the least associated costs5. In fact, the response of the O’Farrell Government was 
couched in precisely these terms in its dealing with recommendation # 5 of the Inquiry, 
guaranteeing grape prices: ‘This would be anti-competitive for the market, as it would put 
NSW winemakers and growers at a competitive disadvantage with other regions where such 
requirements do not apply’. 
Yet the fact that the Inquiry resulted in a ‘Mexican Standoff’ between ideological options 
belies not just the complexity of the empirical world writ large, but also research into the 
wine industry which suggests that there are options for the advancement of regions based 
upon strategies which are grounded in vertical integration, horizontal integration and 
                                               
5 Another witness to the Inquiry, in giving oral evidence, was even more adamant: ‘[W]e are facing a massive 
oversupply. The industry has to adjust one way. If some people have to get out of the industry, this is what they 
have to do. It is the same with anything...’ (Grant, in Catanzariti Inquiry, 2010d, 32). 
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collective action in the form of both ‘chain goods’ and ‘club goods’ in McNutt’s (1999) 
sense6. Perhaps the example most readily at hand to encapsulate the advantages of all these 
situations is that of the ‘Bishop of the Barossa’, Peter Lehmann, who initiated a winery to 
process grapes from share farmers who were suffering the disadvantages of being price-takers 
for their grapes – very similar disadvantages based upon both the power differential and 
information asymmetry currently being experienced in the Riverina (for a discussion of the 
Peter Lehmann example, see Gent, 2003, 315-317). In effect, the problem of being a ‘price-
taker’ is removed if one is making one’s own wine, or if grape growers choose to invest in the 
development of their businesses from grape growing on the one hand to providing a wine 
tourism experience on the other (for an example of this at the individual business level, see 
Grant, 2010). 
Similarly, economies of both scale and scope can be achieved through collective action. 
For example, in her analysis of the growth of the Languedoc-Roussillon region in the south of 
France from the 1960s, Garcia-Parpet (2008) forcefully argued that the local producers were 
able to affect such a successful branding strategy that it undermined the powerful 
Appellations d’Origine Contrôlée (AOC) classification system, to the extent that what was 
once perceived to be le gros rouge wine of the region was transformed to the avant-garde. 
While pursuing a sophisticated marketing strategy clearly represents an economy of scope in 
the sense that an individual grape grower or wine maker could not achieve this by themselves, 
Garcea-Parpet (2008) also provided clear examples of economies of scale being achieved, 
such as the access to technology achieved which was not available to individual producers or 
indeed communes in the region prior to them coming together to share a common strategy, 
and the storing of some surplus of their wines for several years such that it achieved the status 
of vin de garde rather than vin de table. 
Evidence given to the Inquiry discussed these examples (see, for example, Catanzariti 
Inquiry, 2010e) and some scope can be found for pursuing strategies such as those discussed 
above in recommendation # 11 of the Committee’s Final Report, namely ‘That the Wine 
Grapes Marketing Board works with growers in the Riverina to develop a model for 
                                               
6 ‘McNutt observed that club good could be considered as public goods without the condition of non-
excludability. Chain goods resemble club goods in that they are non-rivalrous and selectively excludable. That 
is, members of society outside the value chain are excluded from sharing in any benefits from collective action 
within the chain unless scope exists for “free riding” or because certain members of the chain do not cooperate 
because they feel that they are ‘forced riders’ ... Horizontal and vertical strategic alliances are mechanisms to 
internalise chain goods, formed among groups at the same level and across different levels, respectively, in the 
value chain’ (Mounter, et al., 2011). 
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collective marketing of grapes’ (see Table 1, column 1). Yet the newly elected O’Farrell 
Government chose to totally ignore this recommendation of the Inquiry. 
While such industry-initiated options are available at a regional level, research also 
suggests that ‘light-touch’ governmental assistance can be similarly effective. For example, 
commenting on the development of the branding strategy for the newly named New England 
Australia Wine Region, one local producer praised the NSW I&I Business Development 
Manager in that particular region, stating: ‘Peter Sniekers from the [then] New South Wales 
Department of State and Regional Development started giving us some guidance. He was 
great from day one. We wouldn't have an industry without his input, I feel ...’ (Cassidy, in 
Grant, 2010, 5). The employment of one individual and minimal support staff liaising closely 
to nurture a fledgling industry constitutes ‘light touch’, effective assistance of the wine 
industry in a regional setting7. Again, while the Catanzariti Inquiry recommended that the 
Riverina-based WGMB affect such a regional branding strategy for the Riverina, this 
recommendation was not responded to by the O’Farrell Government. Nevertheless, the point 
in this context is that the options available to both industry and government agencies in these 
contexts, while presented as evidence to the Catanzariti Inquiry and reflected (albeit very 
subtly) in the Inquiry’s final recommendations, were in effect scotched, rather than explored, 
encouraged or developed by the response of the O’Farrell Government. Yet these innovations 
at a local level might well constitute models of business development and government 
assistance that have assisted in growing the wine industry in NSW and in Australia more 
generally. 
Finally we turn to the issue which was the subject of 4 of the 11 recommendations of 
the Catanzariti Inquiry, the Australian Wine Industry Code of Conduct. While in this context 
we are unable to discuss this issue in any degree of depth (and concede that this exercise 
would in any event perhaps best be undertaken by our colleagues in the legal fraternity), some 
observations are warranted.  
The dual aims of the Code as it currently stands (i.e.: as it was jointly devised by the WFA 
and WGGA and implemented in December 2008) fall within the ambit of the Catanzariti 
Inquiry, namely: ‘Firstly to establish a common Australian wine grape supply contract 
framework; secondly to provide a dispute resolution system to manage disagreements which 
                                               
7 In the same interview, the local producer noted that local council had also been involved in the regional 
branding strategy for New England Australia: ‘To Armidale-Dumaresq Council’s credit, they see the potential in 
this region, as far as tourism goes, and they have invested in our branding strategy’ (Cassidy, in Grant, 2010, 4). 
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exist over price or quality assessments’ (WFA/WGGA, 2008, 3). As it currently stands, the 
Code of Conduct offers elegant, yet comprehensive guidelines to achieve these goals. It is 
comprised of 3 main parts. First, that covering ‘Winegrape purchase agreements, dealing with 
no less than 17 elements of the relationship between grape sellers and grape buyers, including 
minimum standards for agreements (they must be in writing, and contain minimum terms and 
conditions, recognition of the relevance of the Code, for example), pricing methods, price 
notification, terms of payment, winegrape standards and assessment, etc. – all elements of the 
grape grower-winemaker relationship which, as we have seen, the Catanzariti Inquiry 
grappled with. Second, a ‘Dispute Resolution’ procedure, which recognises two types of 
disagreement: those over winegrape price (and for which a resolution procedure over 
approximately two weeks is specified) and those over ‘downgrades or rejections of grapes’ 
(for which a far hastier, 7-point procedure is provided over the course of several days). 
Finally, the Code specifies conditions for alleged breaches of the code and procedures for 
dealing with these (WFA/WGGA, 2008). 
As noted in the O’Farrell Government’s response to the Catanzariti Inquiry’s 
recommendations, the Code then under review. Nevertheless, it can be characterised as a 
document resting upon consensual agreement between contracting parties: These parties agree 
to prices, grape quality, delivery schedules, etc., and importantly the appointment of an 
independent expert in the event of any disagreement (with a 3-person committee appointing 
the expert in the case of disagreement concerning who the expert ought to be). In essence, it is 
designed to mitigate against market failure based upon power and information asymmetries. 
Indeed, an analogy can be drawn between the Code and enterprise agreements in industrial 
relations, in that prices are not centrally fixed (as recommendation # 5 of the Inquiry sought to 
do) nor are they determined in haste in situations of the aforementioned asymmetries. Rather, 
they are consensually agreed upon with a mechanism of arbitration resting some distance 
from the negotiation of agreements, but to which an appeal can nevertheless be made.  
The problem with the Code of Conduct as it stands, however, is that very few 
winemakers are signatories. At its commencement in December 2009, only 7 winemaking 
companies were signatories – albeit some of these 7 being extremely large concerns8. At the 
time of writing, both the WFA and WAGGA were only targeting 25 percent of the top 100 
wineries to sign up by December 2012 and 50 percent by December 2013, with WGGA 
                                               
8 The original signatories to the agreement were Banlaves of Coonawarra, Constellation Australia, Henry 
Holmes Wines, Orlando Wines, Rusden Wines, Treasury Estate Wines and Tyrrell’s Vineyards (WGGA, 2011b, 
2). 
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stating: ‘[we] see the large weight of promotional responsibility to fall on the WFA’; and that: 
‘at the same time, WGGA urges its members to insist that their off-takers [i.e.: buyers] are 
signatories’ (WAGGA, 2011b, 2). 
Potentially, one way of overcoming this problem would be to legislate that all 
commercial winemakers in a particular jurisdiction are obliged to be signatories to the Code – 
in fact the Catanzariti Inquiry did recommend ‘that the NSW Minister for Primary Industries 
pursue the introduction of a mandatory Code of Conduct through the Primary Industries 
Ministerial Council’ (i.e.: recommendation # 8), to which the O’Farrell Government replied 
by delaying any response until the current review of the Code of Conduct is completed. There 
are no specific objections to the introduction of the Code being mandatory in the literature of 
the Catanzariti Inquiry. Yet it is not difficult to construct such an argument based on laissez 
fair principles. Such an argument would assert that adherence to a code would constitute an 
unnecessary transaction cost to the business of making wine, thereby rendering the industry 
less efficient. It might also argue that an otherwise unnecessary bureaucracy would be created 
to oversee and enforce the Code – to which there is opportunity costs attached, and that the 
wine industry would suffer as it became more prone to institutionalised disputes between 
growers and wine makers; in effect a ‘kangaroo court’ which would conflate the operation of 
well established legislation such as the Trade Practices Act (1974). 
However, several factors suggest that the scenario envisioned by the laissez fair 
argument would not eventuate. First, there are inherent disincentives for any party to become 
involved in any dispute procedure: As well as the sheer time and vexation of such an exercise, 
all costs of providing an Independent Expert are borne by the parties involved, not 
government. Further, developing a reputation as a vexatious supplier of wine grapes would 
also act as a disincentive against initiating a dispute. Moreover, due to the necessarily speedy 
nature of the stipulated dispute resolution procedures with respect to both prices and 
downgrades and rejections, disputes could not be extended, litigious affairs: They might be 
cause of considerable vexation for the parties involved; however this type of procedure does 
not bear the same magnitude of costs associated with formal court proceedings. 
Second, we observed in our account of the evidence given to the Catanzariti Inquiry that 
according to the Chief Economist of NSW I& I, Scott Davenport, ‘the market failure we 
[ought to be] talking about here is the unconscionable conduct issue, so that we confine our 
focus to that’. While Mr Davenport also asserted that ‘The Commonwealth has always taken a 
strong view that this is what the Trade Practices Act is there for...’, a Code of Conduct does 
not interfere with the operation of any such law. Indeed, in the case of the Wine Industry 
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Code of Conduct, the document states that ‘the provisions of this Code are subject to all 
applicable Commonwealth, State and Territory laws and common law rights and obligations 
(WFA/WAGGA, 2008, 7). Arguably, the effect of the Code becoming mandatory would be to 
simply render what is conscionable conduct open to negotiation underlain by the rule of law: 
In effect a ‘Gentleman’s Agreement’ which by definition is pre-litigious. This does not imply 
that such agreements would be free from conflict based upon power asymmetries and 
perceived (and real) conflicts of interest. Nevertheless, it provides some structure for this 
conflict and for its resolution – in other words, politics, properly conceived (i.e.: 
institutionalised and subject to democratic oversight). 
Third, the introduction of a compulsory Code of Conduct would not be at the expense of 
competition, nor of the operation of markets: It does not imply price-setting other than 
between those who are part to a contract. If such a price cannot be agreed upon, a contract is 
not initiated. This fact allows for what many, in their evidence to the Catanzariti Inquiry, 
perceived as the necessary structural adjustment of the industry in dealing with the problem of 
oversupply to take place. Forth, two of the intrinsic advantages of Australia’s federal system 
of government (indeed any federal system generally) is that legislation can be designed which 
will be effective for one jurisdiction while it may not be effective for all, and as an adjunct to 
this, one sovereign jurisdiction can act as a laboratory for all others by testing different 
regulatory regimes. In this sense, recommendation # 9 – that the NSW Minister for Primary 
Industry Minister pursue national implementation of a mandatory Code of Conduct through 
the Primary Industries Ministerial Council – can be assessed, with hindsight, as somewhat 
misdirected. NSW could introduce a mandatory Code of Conduct and trial it for a specific 
period. 
Finally, perhaps the most appealing reason for introducing a mandatory Code of 
Conduct is that it necessarily brings the two parties of what has in some instances been an 
antagonistic relationship to the table. While the immediate goal may be to fairly negotiate a 
price for wine grapes, initiating such a dialogue could form the basis of exploring possibilities 
for different business models based upon different forms of cooperation such as those centred 
on club goods, chain goods and horizontal and vertical integration. This, combined with ‘soft 







This paper has examined the background, operations and recommendations of the Catanzariti 
Inquiry conducted by the NSW Legislative Council’s Standing Committee on state 
Development in 2010 and the ensuing response by the O’Farrell Government, tabled 12 
December 2011. We have argued that the responses to the travails of the NSW wine industry 
– in particular its grape growers – by both the Inquiry and the Government were blunted by 
ideological responses juxtaposed against one another. Further, we have suggested that the 
basis for more a subtle interpretation of the dilemmas facing the industry has been laid in 
previous research, and that the introduction of a mandatory Code of Conduct, for a trial period 
in NSW has much to offer as a means to redirect what we have referred to as ‘the governance 
of grapes’.  
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